Middle Knowledge: Latin-Scientia Media (In Brief)

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Simon Blackburn documents in his entry 'scientia media' that middle knowledge is the way that God has of knowing the truth in regard to future events. This speculatively for philosophers ables God to reconcile his present knowledge with open choices. Blackburn (1996: 343). In other words this view of middle knowledge presupposes a type of libertarian free will and incompatibilism. Free will and related topics have been discussed many times on this blog in previous posts and definitions can be found by the use of the 'search' application. This view reasons that there is the simultaneous act of  given grace and the persons freely accepting it, as opposed to a prior determination of that grace leading to acceptance. Blackburn (1996: 343). The concept was elaborated on by Luis de Molina (1535-1600). Blackburn (1996: 343). It is known as a view among many of the followers of Thomas Aquinas. Blackburn (1996: 343).

William Hasker explains middle knowledge is knowledge of certain kinds of propositions usually defined as 'counterfactuals of freedom' traced back to Luis de Molina. Hasker (1996: 492). These propositions state in each situation, concerning each possible free creature that God could create, and what that creature would do in each situation with the use of libertarian free will/choice. Hasker (1996: 492). The claim that God with foreknowledge knows these libertarian potential actions explains how he can maintain providential control over the universe. Hasker (1996: 492). Hasker argues that opponents of middle knowledge typically state that it is impossible for there to be true counterfactuals of freedom. Haskter (1996: 492). By this I reason he means knowledge of what might have occured with the use of free will, assuming it libertarian. The view is indeed questionable without libertarian freedom.

A view of middle knowledge is also known as Molinism. Middle knowledge was a view I came across in my MPhil and PhD theses work within texts and journal articles which dealt with the problem of evil and theodicy, free will and determinism, but I never actually discussed it thoroughly within either theses work.

My view is a Reformed view of compatibilism and reasons that God as first cause wills all things. Therefore God would not only have knowledge and foreknowledge of all potential and actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free will, but God would cause and will as the primary cause the actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic beings and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free wills and these finite beings would be secondary causes.  If any secondary thoughts, acts/actions were somehow forced or coerced, for example, with the use of drugs forced upon him or her, a human being would not be morally responsible lacking significant freedom. God as infinite, eternal, and holy would will all things in moral and ethical perfection even when at times willing events that were evil, although I reason leading to greater good purposes.

As God would cause and will all things things in a compatibilist sense this would go beyond incompatibilistic middle knowledge in regard to the sovereignty and providence of God, and I do not hold to libertarian free will for created finite beings.  I do not hold to 'determinism' or to be more clear hard determinism, but hold to soft-determinism.  John Calvin explains this basic idea in theological terms as opposed to philosophical in 'Bondage and Liberation of the Will' in stating that Satan too and all wicked are under submission to God and his authority and cannot move beyond the commands of the sovereign God. They are guided divinely.  Calvin (1543)(1996: 39). Further Calvin explains that God uses the evil work of persons and executes his works through them. Calvin (1543)(1996: 39).  I reason a connection here could be made to Romans 8: 26-30 in that all things do work together for the good for those that love God.

As stated on this blog previously in various posts:
John S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism doesnot allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, cansimultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will orwill not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certainnonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunctionwith human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With thisviewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would createhuman beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committedactions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explainsthat moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of softdeterminism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions areuncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976:29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within humanactions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30). Calvin explains:
'If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection.' Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).
Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or anyother being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can anyaction be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human actionto remain significantly free. Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilismthat God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantlyfree human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God cansimultaneously will significantly free human actions.

Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no oneis responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rationalcreatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they aredone voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).
Therefore, middle knowledge although a logical view with merit is not a philosophically necessary view or most reasonable view to accept within a Reformed perspective.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG. JOHN S.(1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and RandallBasinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids,Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.),Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York,Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

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