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Preface
I am working on Chapter One from my PhD for a potential journal article. This struck me as most interesting from today's monotonous 'torture' while dealing with MS Word and the turning of United Kingdom style footnotes into Harvard style in-notes, among other things. If you appreciate my theological, Biblical Studies posts such as the James and Matthew posts, my previous two articles, please comment on them and this is an indicator besides pageviews. Yes, I intend to present both articles related to theodicy/the problem of evil and other on this blog.
Thank you very much.
I am primarily researching and writing onthe logical and not the evidential, gratuitous problem of evil, since althoughI can accept that Plantinga has primarily successfully dealt with the logicalproblem of evil, as described within his system and assumptions,[1] I reason that Plantinga’s free will approach is not the best andmost effective system within Christian theism for dealing with the issue.[2] A well-constructed sovereignty approach,[3]such as will be presented by John S. Feinberg in Chapter Three: SovereigntyTheodicy, is better equipped at dealing with both the logical and gratuitousproblem. I also embed my own sovereigntytheodicy throughout this thesis, particularly in Chapter Three.[4] Within this thesis my ownconcepts of sovereignty theodicy are discussed in contrast to the approachesreviewed.[5] Plantinga’s (1982) approachis problematic due largely to his support of the idea that God could not createsignificantly free, good creatures that would only commit good acts at alltimes.[6] Welty rejects Plantinga’sidea that God cannot create a world containing moral good and no moral evil,[7] and raises the objection that God brought Christ into the world asa sinless human being.[8] Welty’s point here is thatevery human being could have therefore been sinless[9] and the world could contain good and no evil with significantly freehuman beings that would not commit wrong actions.[10] I have a similar objection to Welty’s,[11] which shall be discussed in Chapters Two and Three. Within my theodicy, I reason that God couldhave, if he wished, made significantly free human beings, or human like beingswho would have been perfectly morally good and would not commit wrong actions.[12] God’s choice not to createsuch beings, in my mind is not a sign of a lack of power, or moral failure, butrather the use of his own perfect and significantly free will for goodpurposes. In Chapter Four, with mydiscussion on the evidential, gratuitous problem of evil, it shall be seen thata sovereignty theodicy can reasonably and successfully deal with both thelogical and evidential problem of evil, and therefore the evidential problem isnot a greater difficulty for theists than the logical one, rather it is simplya newer type of criticism since theism has been able to defend itselfsubstantially through the use of free will approaches.[13] However, I can agree withDurston that even if there is no such thing as gratuitous evil,[14]which is my position, large amounts of evil that appear gratuitous will exist.[15] This would be evil that I would considerunexplainable, humanly speaking, but would not be gratuitous from God’sperspective. God can use evil for hisgreater purposes, but this does not mean that any person will completelyunderstand why certain evils exist.[16] God’s attribute of omniscience provides himknowledge in order to work his plans for the greater good within creation thatno other being can possess without God revealing this information.
[1] Primarily from Plantinga’s book, God,Freedom, and Evil (1977).[2] This will bediscussed primarily in Chapters Two and Three.[3] With Reformedtheological deductions.[4] It is similar, but not identical toFeinberg’s approach, which I shall point out. [5] It is not necessary for me to present myown theodicy Chapter within this work, as my views shall be explainedthroughout this thesis.[6] Plantinga (1982: 166-167). This is an aspect of incompatibilism, whichshall be primarily defined and discussed in Chapter Two.[7] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30). Welty (1999: 1).[8] Welty (1999: 1).[9] Welty (1999: 1).[10] Welty (1999: 1).[11] Welty (1999: 1).[12] This is an aspect of compatibilism, whichshall be primarily defined and discussed in Chapters Two and Three.[13] Freewill approaches can be logicallycoherent, although not necessarily true. [14] Durston (2000:79).[15] Durston (2000: 79).[16] Durston (2000:79).
DURSTON, KIRK(2000) ‘The Consequential Complexity of History and Gratuitous Evil’, in Religious Studies, Volume 36, pp. 65-80.Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
PLANTINGA, ALVINC. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil,Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVINC. (1982) The Nature of Necessity,Oxford, Clarendon Press.
WELTY, GREG(1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in GregWelty PhD, Fort Worth, Texas.Philosophy Department, Southwestern BaptistTheological Seminary.
Further comments
End
For Uncle Chucky and Bobby...
I think the first time with the end solo since 1983. According to my unofficial albums. I have not been collecting since I was a child. The second clip is the better one, at the end, the 6:30 mark.
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