Fatalism Revisited

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Edinburgh Castle (trekearth)

Nov 2007 Fatalism

Newly presented and updated:
Edinburgh: 1995

I find a rare Jazz Fusion unofficial CD, featuring an artist I was looking for at a flea market. I explain this to the seller and he states. ‘It was fate’ with a strong Scottish accent. ‘Pardon’ I said, ‘It was fate’, he stated. I thought he had said ‘It was fiit’.

Compatibilism/soft determinism:

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Louis P. Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596). J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).
Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.

Fatalism compared with hard determinism:

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137). Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281). Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).

Fatalism should not be equated with compatibilism/soft determinism, but if fatalism states that no human actions can influence or cause events, and hard determinism holds that human beings do not cause actions or are morally responsible, there is clearly a similarity in definitions. D.G. Bloesch explains that fate is not chance, but instead is cosmic determinism that has no meaning or purpose. Bloesch (1996: 407). He writes that fate/fatalism would differ from a Christian idea of divine providence and its implied use of determinism, in that fatalism is impersonal and irrational, whereas providence is personal and rational. Bloesch (1996: 407). Thiessen comments that fatalism is not determinism because fatalism holds that all events are caused by fate, and not natural causes, and nothing can change these events. Determinism in contrast, holds that all events occur by necessity. Thiessen (1956: 186). Compatibilism and soft determinism does hold that what God determines must happen by necessity, but reasons that rational beings with a significant use of free will are not coerced or forced to commit acts, which must occur by necessity. A person can hold to hard determinism and believe that God determined all events without the significant use of free will of rational creatures, and a fatalist can also believe that events are determined without the use of significant free will of rational creatures, and yet this is caused without any meaning, and without the understanding that God or any rational entity is behind these events.

PhD Viva

I was challenged on the similarities between fatalism and my view of determinism, which is soft-determinism/compatibilism in Wales in January 2009 at my PhD Viva. I used the material from the 2007 post in the defence. I think I was successful. The reviewer noted that there are definite similarities in that both determinism and fatalism bring about events by necessity without libertarian free will from a secondary cause, but I did note correctly that determinism was theistic, at least in the context discussed and fatalism not for certain, it could for example exist in a naturalistic philosophical context.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Fatalism’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 137. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland.

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.


Edinburgh Castle (Google Images)


Edinburgh, The Path (trekearth)


Edinburgh, 1995 trip


Giants Causeway, Northern Ireland 1995 trip


Cliffs of Moher, Irish Republic 1995 trip

Webcam Post I

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Firefox earned the position recently as my default browser but lately problems have occurred with Blogger. I cannot see the video with Firefox, and it may be the case on your computer with Firefox as well. On my computer the video can be seen with Internet Explorer, Safari and Google Chrome.


Vancouver (Google Images)


Vancouver (Google Images)


New Westminster BC (trekearth)


New Westminster BC (trekearth)

From Facebook on Sunday:

A first: With a friend trying to be squeezed for more tip money by a restaurant owner after a supposed missed payment within the group which was not a missed payment. Ended on a handshake in agreement.

Additional:

The restuarant owner stated at first 'Pwan guy not pay!' and the pwan guy is a commenter on this blog that did pay which the restaurant owner eventually admitted.

Yes, this means it is the end of my audio posts which usually ended up being deleted without my permission by filefreak, or I needed to delete them on Shaw, my internet provider, to make room for the newer ones. I do however have my audio posts stored on DVD. As noted previously I can share them if requested but the posts usually contained a written section as well.

Webcam experiments July 21, 2012 the first two, July 23-24, 2012, the last photos.











My first Samsung Galaxy S2 photo. Definite upgrade from the Blackberry Curve. An upgrade for my blogs.

The Best Possible World? (PhD Edit)

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Seine River, Paris (trekearth)

J. L. Mackie and the Best Possible World Objection

The next objection Plantinga deals with is Mackie’s atheistic compatibilism[1] which, in part, assumes a perfectly good God[2] should have created, if he exists, a best possible world.[3] Leibniz believes God had an infinite number of worlds to choose from to create, and chose the best possible world.[4] Mackie’s ‘Evil and Omnipotence’ in Mind (1971) removes the possibility of hard determinism and postulates God could have made free creatures that only do what is right.[5] They do not have to be determined because God could have made people in a way they freely always chose what was right[6] even though, unlike Flew’s determinism,[7] wrong actions would be a technical possibility.[8] Plantinga admits it is logically possible, in a broad sense, there could be a world containing creatures that only do what is right.[9] Plantinga explains and rejects Mackie’s concept of possible worlds and does this with two main objections.[10] First, no matter how wonderful a world appears to be, no matter how many incredibly happy people there are, it is always possible there is an even better world containing more people who are even happier.[11] Plantinga’s reasoning appears sound as any finite world God would create could always be better.[12] Only an infinite world would be the best possible world, and it is debatable and unlikely God could create an infinite world. The fact that a world is created means it is not infinitely old or eternal, and so this would seemingly make the concept of a created infinite world untenable.

Plantinga’s second objection to Mackie’s best possible world idea concerns the concept of human free choice.[13] Plantinga describes Paul (1) accepting an offer, or (2) rejecting an offer.[14] Whichever choice Paul makes, either (1) or (2), God would not be able to actualize that world.[15] If Paul would make a wrong choice at any point, the problem of evil would occur, and the world would no longer be the best possible as Mackie describes.[16] To Plantinga, the result of God creating significantly free creatures is that their decisions did impact which type of world God created, and how much evil it would contain.[17] God’s omnipotence, to Plantinga, could not guarantee a best possible world free from evil, because there is always a possibility of human decisions that are contrary to what God would have desired.[18] Since significantly free creatures exist, it is never up to God alone in regard to which world is actualized.[19]

Augustine, like Plantinga, seemingly did assume free creatures will eventually make one wrong decision, this making Mackie’s idea that human beings could always freely choose the right seem untenable to these free will proponents.[20] At the same time, both Augustine and Plantinga would reject Mackie’s notion that if God is understood and accepted, as in traditional Christian theism, he should have created a best possible world filled with perfect creatures that never do wrong actions,[21] and because God did not do this atheism would be the preferred philosophy to adopt. Both free will advocates have stated that significantly free creatures by definition could not be guaranteed by God to avoid wrong actions,[22] and thus when wrong actions occur it is because of the human abuse of free will only.[23] God is not to be blamed for creating a good thing, that being free will, which is willfully turned towards something evil by his human creation.[24]

Feinberg

Feinberg holds to modified rationalism and a sovereignty theodicy view similar to mine which was explained in Chapter Two as the idea that God was not obligated to create anything, including a world, but chose to create purely from his own desires.[25] Within modified rationalism, the concept of a best possible world is denied in favour of the view that God chose to create the present world which was initially perfectly good.[26] The fact that the problem of evil exists would be seen within modified rationalism as a result of the free choice of human beings to rebel against God in both free will and sovereignty theodicy which both deny the notion of best possible world.[27] Modified rationalism would oppose the best possible world concepts of Leibniz from the Enlightenment era, and Mackie from the modern era.[28]

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FLEW, ANTONY (1955) ‘Theology and Falsification’, in Antony Flew and A. MacIntrye (eds.), New Essays in Philosophical Theology, London, SCM, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

LAFOLLETTE, HUGH (1980) ‘Plantinga on Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11, The Hague, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers.

LEIBNIZ, G.W. (1710)(1998) Theodicy, Translated by E.M. Huggard Chicago, Open Court Classics.

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

[1] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34).

[2] LaFollette (1980: 2). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34). Phillips (2005: 3).

[3] LaFollette (1980: 2). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34).

[4] Leibniz (1710)(1990).

[5] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[6] LaFollette (1980: 2).

[7] Flew (1955: 150-153). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31).

[8] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[9] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).

[10] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-64).

[11] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34).

[12] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34).

[13] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 39-44). LaFollette (1980: 3).

[14] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 40-42). There are possible worlds that God cannot actualize. LaFollette (1980: 3).

[15] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 42).

[16] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 42).

[17] Plantinga (1982: 180-181). Therefore, for Plantinga some worlds cannot be actualized. LaFollette (1980: 4).

[18] Plantinga (1982: 180-181). LaFollette (1980: 4).

[19] Geivett (1993: 196).

[20] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3).

[21] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[22] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Plantinga (1982: 189).

[23] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Plantinga (1982: 189).

[24] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33). Plantinga (1982: 170-171). The free will theist that reasons evil is adequately explained is left with the religious problem of individual suffering, according to LaFollette. LaFollette (1980: 1).

[25] Feinberg (1994: 36).

[26] Plantinga (1982: 167-189). Feinberg (1994: 36).

[27] Plantinga (1982: 167-189). Feinberg (1994: 36).

[28] Leibniz (1710)(1990). Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33).

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Infinite Versus Finite (God, Creation)

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Glasgow (trekearth)

I have taken material from previous posts 'Infinite' and 'Infinite Revisited' edited some material and added some in for more of the 'finite' angle to be included.

Philosopher Blackburn explains that the infinite is unlimited and that which is beyond anything that is fixed and bound. Blackburn (1996: 193). In contrast a ‘finite set’ (example used) is a set that stops at a point, somewhere. Blackburn (1996: 140). Brian Davies writes that the English word infinity comes from the Latin word ‘infinitas’, meaning boundless or endless. Davies (1999: 298). Davies states that some have ascribed the term infinity with various degrees of understanding of substance, time, space, the universe, numbers, and classes. Davies (1999: 298). He mentions that many philosophers have dealt with the issue of infinity through the centuries, but Biblically speaking there is not a doctrine of infinity. Davies (1999: 298). Biblically there is not a specific philosophical explanation of a doctrine of the infinite God. He explains that God's infinity is viewed as marking his perfection, and that God alone is understood as infinite. Davies (1999: 298). As one could count to the minus and to the plus to infinity, numbers could be considered infinite in a sense, but are not ontological living beings. As God is uncreated and uncreatable, he is alone is infinite ontologically. God would not be limited by time and space, and so in another sense created matter and space would be considered finite and not infinite within traditional Christian thought. God would be superior to all creatures and would be omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, and eternal. Davies (1999: 298). Davies notes that process theology has postulated that God's personal nature means that he can change as he works within created time. Davies (1999: 228). Process theology reasons that God possibly develops in personality as he deals with his created beings. Davies (1999: 228).

It could be stated that if God's nature can be changed and develop within time, then he is not infinite, but rather the most advanced finite being in existence. A finite being that is beyond matter, perhaps. I reject process theology's notion of a finite God, for at least the following reasons.

It could be argued that if God is not infinite then he cannot posses any infinite attributes, and this would prohibit God from being eternal. To be eternal would mean that one has unlimited life. If God is not eternal, then how did God come to exist? If there was a God that created God and so on, there is the problem of vicious regress in which there are a hypothetical infinite regressions of Gods. If it is suggested at some point the regression ends, why cannot one simply reject the vicious regress and state that the Biblical God, or a God, is the only God? To state that God simply came to exist from nothing does not seem reasonable, and the suggestion answers nothing. If God is merely finite, then one has a problem of determining the first cause. A reasonable explanation is that God prior to time eternally was and eternally is today.

Many scientists and scholars reason that the universe is 15-20 billion years old, and believe in a 'Big Bang Theory'. Whether the universe is billions, millions, or thousands of years is not the primary concern of this article, but with a big bang model or like, the universe in agreement with the Bible, is not eternal. Billions, millions, or thousands of years is more time than any of human being, only living 100+ years maximum in the modern age can comprehend and may be considered perhaps from a human perspective, virtual eternity, but is not actual eternity, and therefore is not infinite. Since God created matter in Genesis, Chapter 1, it is clear that nothing within the material, physical realm existed prior to creation. This would leave God, and perhaps the angelic beings prior to the existence of matter. It can be deduced that angels cannot be infinite in nature, because if they were limitless in nature they would themselves be God. It can be reasoned there are two or more limitless beings by definition as they simply would be an aspect of one infinite, eternal God of one substance. Thiessen notes angels are not eternal although the Bible does not state when they were created. Thiessen (1956: 191). Thiessen thinks angels may have been formed at the Genesis 1 creation or just after. Thiessen (1956: 191). I would of course have no definite idea, but think that angels were created within time. I do not reason that angels existed in a timeless state with God. I would deduce that even non-physical finite spiritual beings must exist within time, although not necessarily within physical matter, in order to process thought patterns, as God alone is all-knowing and does not need to process thoughts within time. I would conclude this point by stating that God alone existed before the creation of matter and angelic beings. Again, God eternally simply was and is.

I suppose it possible and perhaps reasonable for God to instantaneously provide angelic beings with information in a timeless state, and at the same time  I deduce information would also have to be available for demonic beings in the spiritual realm if time does not exist there, in order for them to function as the Bible has them. I am not meaning solar time, but time allotted for a finite spiritual being to process thoughts. For example, angels to process instructions from God and communicate and for demonic beings to communicate.

I reason a timeless state is more difficult philosophically as in likely being correct than a spiritual realm of some sort with time where angels and demons would work.

Millard J. Erickson discusses the Scriptural concept of God's existence in contrast to that of his creation. In Acts 17: 24-25 it states that God does not dwell physically, but is the creator of everything. Erickson notes that God is called the first and last in Isaiah 44: 6, and the Alpha and Omega in Revelation 1:8, 21:6, and 22:13. The idea being shown here is that God has always existed and will always exist. Erickson (1994: 273-274).

As pointed out previously, before the creation of matter and the angels nothing else would have existed. There is also the idea put across in Scripture that God is immutable and does not change in his nature. Malachi 3:6 states that the Lord does not change and Erickson views this as referring to God’s nature and attributes.

God and not his creation, is alone infinite in the sense described.

Human beings in contrast are finite. Humanity has a distinct Biblical religious historical beginning in Genesis 1-2, and a secular historical beginning which is not certain as far as date. From a Biblical perspective, even with promises of everlasting life for those in Christ a human being that lives forever with a resurrected body is still finite ontologically.

Any other living creatures that would exist in the new creation described in Revelation would also be finite.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

DAVIES, BRIAN (1999) ‘Infinity’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.


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A Paradox

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Philosopher Simon Blackburn explains a paradox arises when a set of apparently incontrovertible premises provides what would be viewed as unacceptable or contradictory conclusions. Blackburn (1996: 276). John Etchemendy writes that seemingly sound reasoning based on assumptions leads to conclusions contradictory or obviously false. Etchemendy (1996: 558).

Blackburn uses the 'barber paradox' (page 36) where a village has a barber in it, who shaves all and only the persons that do not shave themselves. Therefore who shaves the barber? If he shaves himself, then he does not, but if he shaves himself, then he does. Blackburn (1996: 36). Blackburn provides the opinion that in reality philosophically there would be no such barber. The situation is inconsistent. Blackburn (1996: 36).

He references Russell's paradox and the class of all classes that are not members of themselves.

'If it is, then it is not, and if it not, then it is'. Blackburn (1996: 336).

Again an inconsistency and Blackburn notes what a 'class' is needs to be more clearly defined.

With paradoxes such as these that arise in certain arguments within theology and philosophy it is often important to simply deny certain assumptions, premises, propositions that can lead to illogical, inconsistent and false conclusions.

I agree with Etchemendy as he stated paradoxes are often solved when mistaken principles or assumptions are found and rejected. Etchemendy (1996: 558).

This was a very useful in working through theological and philosophical theodicy and problem of evil arguments. Often a way to deny apparent paradoxes is to seriously examine if premises in actuality should be accepted as presented. Often this is more important than concentrating primarily on the conclusion or conclusions.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

ETCHEMENDY, JOHN (1996) ‘Paradox’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.